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ABSTRACT 
Nonprofit Human Services Organizations (NPO) are normally considered to do all 
they can to work toward providing clients with optimal services (Bowman, 2011). What 
has not been considered is the possibility that NPOs sometimes allocate more revenue 
toward accumulating profit than toward generating services. This study used IRS 990 
Forms of 150 private nonprofits from 2009 to 2010 to investigate whether NPOs did this 
at the peak of the recent recession, a time when there was a strong need for NPOs to 
increase their level of services. Results showed revenue increased 56%, services 
increased 1.4%, profit increased 43%, operating margin decreased -15%, and equity 
balance increased 24%. This study raised issues of social justice in how some NPOs 
manage their finances, as well as augmenting social workers’ understanding of how 
NPOs can successfully serve their communities.     
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CHAPTER I 
 INTRODUCTION 
Nonprofit Human Services Organizations, or NPOs, were created with the 
intention of helping alleviate some of society’s more complex social problems (i.e. 
homelessness, mental health issues, discrimination, poverty, disease, sexism, social 
justice etc.) (Blalack, 2016). In order to do this, NPOs must hire and secure funding for a 
wide-range of service professionals to include licensed practitioners, janitors, 
administrators, and sometimes lawyers and doctors (Sontag-Padilla, Staplefoote, & 
Morganti, 2012). These service professionals work to provide clients with the help and 
services they need in order to live a more meaningful life; however, if an NPO realizes 
the environment they operate in is financially unstable, they may decide that in order to 
survive they need to allocate more of their revenue toward increasing their profit margin 
than toward increasing their service offerings. Bowman (2011) argued NPOs in these 
tough financial situations will nevertheless do all they can to provide clients the needed 
amount of services, “The data tell a familiar story: ordinary nonprofits stretching their 
resources to the limit and exposing themselves to long-and short-term risks to serve their 
clients” (p. 48). It is expected NPOs in tough financial situations will still focus more on 
generating services than accumulating profit.  
Bowman’s (2011) argument may not be true if an NPO realizes their profit 
margin needs to be increased to prepare for future financial difficulties. Other researchers
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(Calabrese, 2010; Ramirez, 2011) argued NPOs tend to avoid putting themselves in a 
worse financial situation by preserving, or increasing, their profit margin. 
Little research has been found on the reasons NPOs might choose to increase their 
profit margin more than maintaining the same level of services (Francois, 2015). A 
possible explanation for this lack of interest may be such research can be viewed as 
painting a very dark picture of how NPOs manage their finances. The choice to make 
profit in financially difficult times can be easily interpreted as NPOs’ intend to make or 
keep their money over helping clients in need of services (Calabrese, 2012). Even though 
NPOs may sometimes have to do this to survive (Calabrese, 2012), because of the 
likelihood to be misconstrued as selfish behavior in NPOs, researchers may choose not to 
ask why NPOs might choose to keep profit, less the researchers become labeled as giving 
NPOs a bad name. It is very likely that in order to avoid possible negative publicity (i.e. 
being categorized as an agitator) researchers have been more prone to study topics such 
as “Revenue Diversification in Nonprofit Organizations: Does it Lead to Financial 
Stability?” (Carroll & Stater, 2008, p. 947); or “Which Nonprofit Gets More Government 
Funding?” (Lu, 2015, p. 297). This may be why there are significantly more journal 
articles demonstrating how efficient and effective NPOs are with their money, rather than 
journal articles discussing some of the more troubling things NPOs need to do in order to 
continue providing clients with quality services.  
A search of Abilene Christian University’s (ACU) library database revealed 
48,247 related journal articles on financial effectiveness in NPOs and 3,977 related 
journal articles on service reduction and cash holding in NPOs.  
 
3 
 
 
Examining what some of their more troubling things are, however, is imperative  
to conduct quality research, and it may clear up some of the misconceptions researchers 
may have on how NPOs manage their finances. For example, it seems to be characteristic 
of researchers to think NPOs should accumulate profit instead of generate more services, 
so they can at least offer some services in the future, as opposed to risking being shut 
down and offering no services. Instead of ruling out this possibility, examining this 
possibility may augment researchers’ knowledge on what NPOs need to do to survive in 
tough financial situations. The result may enhance researchers’ ability to assist NPOs in 
these situations. What seems like a dark picture of how NPOs manage their finances, 
then, may turn out to be not so dark after all. To provide a philosophical analogy, 
sometimes what others believe is evil or immoral may turn out to be good and vice-versa 
(Nietzsche, trans. 1982). 
Removing Profit Accumulation in NPOs from the Shadows 
Tuckman and Chang (1994) suggested the small number of journal articles on 
profit accumulation in NPOs indicated researchers are more interested in verifying NPOs 
fulfil their mission on low budgets. At least this seems to be the reason why few research 
articles have been published over the years regarding the decision to accumulate profit in 
NPOs (Calabrese, 2012). One of the few times this was ever discussed, in fact, was in 
1994 by Tuckman and Chang, who identified five critical reasons why nonprofit 
managers may choose to hold on to and accumulate a financial surplus; the most primary 
of which, arguably, was to “… hedge against risk and uncertainty” (p. 132). Consistent 
with future research findings, these notable researchers additionally pointed out the 
nonprofit sector’s equity steadily grew “… from $101 billion in 1975 to $191 billion in 
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1983,” or an increase of $5 billion after adjusting for inflation (p. 130). In support of this, 
it does not take much effort in searching through government databases to notice that 
over time NPOs have typically held on to and generated more and more profit, totaling 
“… 5.4 percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP)” by 2012 (McKeever & 
Pettijohn, 2014, p. 1). For reasons not yet clear, though, a search from Google Scholar 
found only 132 articles citing Tuckman and Chang’s 1994 article in the past 23 years. 
The majority of studies regarding profit accumulation in NPOs may only exist in the 
shadows of scholarly research.  
It wasn’t until 2011 (17 years after Tuckman and Chang’s 1994 research) that 
additional studies were conducted on the topic of why NPOs may choose to accumulate 
profit. Calabrese (2012) examined some of the reasons why NPOs might do this, making 
a similar conclusion as Tuckman and Chang (1994) that, generally speaking, “… 
nonprofits target profits and seek their accumulation over time” to avoid making 
themselves vulnerable to future financial depreciation(s) (p. 300). However, Calabrese 
did not examine whether they would sometimes allocate more revenue toward profit than 
services to avoid this situation. Ramirez (2011), who only a year prior to Calabrese 
(2012) examined the determinants and implications of cash holding in NPOs, also did 
not. Instead, these two researchers pointed out that contrary to popular belief (Tuckman 
& Chang, 1991; Greenlee & Trussel, 2000), it is appropriate for NPOs to sometimes act 
more in accordance with their for-profit counter-parts by accumulating larger and larger 
profit margins. They inadvertently supported Tuckman and Chang’s conclusion that 
“[S]ociety would be well served if nonprofit finances were removed from the shadows” 
(p. 133). Doing so should give researchers and educators better insight into the decisions 
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NPOs make to keep and build their profit margin and stay financially afloat (Tuckman & 
Chang). This will give researchers a better understanding of the obstacles NPOs face 
when creating profit margins.  
The Problem of Accumulating Profit in NPOs 
 Typically, it has been thought that any extra finances NPOs have accumulated 
should be used toward supporting services and that NPOs that hold onto these profits are 
in violation of their 501(C) (3) tax exemption status (Calabrese, 2012). This is simply not 
true. While avoiding profit accumulation by spending excess revenue on services paints 
an ideal picture of how NPOs might operate, NPOs that do not save any finances are ill-
prepared to weather future financial storms (Mitchell, 2015). This leaves NPOs in a very 
awkward position. On the one hand, NPOs, such as the Clinton Foundation, have been 
heavily scrutinized for the amount of profit they have accumulated, which as of 2014 was 
$371,958,668 (Clinton Foundation, n.d.); however, on the other hand, most small NPOs 
could not survive a significant loss in funding (Mitchell). The good news is charity 
watchdogs, such as Charity Navigator (2016), understandably permit NPOs to maintain a 
certain level of finances in their profit margin without receiving penalty (e.g., NPOs with 
too much money in their profit margin receive a lower rating and, as a result, may receive 
less financial support from donors) (Calabrese, n.d.). Research, however, supports the 
idea that donors understand NPOs need to accumulate profit in case their revenue begins 
to decrease (Calabrese, n.d.; Charles & Kim, 2016; Ramirez, 2011). 
Therefore, the problem with accumulating profit lies in determining the point at 
which an NPO’s finances are in excess of the amount needed to maintain operational 
costs (i.e., service expenses) should revenue suddenly begin depreciating (Calabrese, 
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2012; Tuckman & Chang, 1991). The easiest way of making this determination of excess 
profit is by subtracting total liabilities from total assets (which equals total net assets) and 
then seeing if the resulting number is sufficient to cover monthly, or even yearly, 
expenses (Bowman, 2011; Calabrese, 2012). The total net assets resulting from this 
equation is the money available in liquid revenue (or cash on hand), hard assets (land, 
power, and equipment), and investments that NPOs can use to pay their bills should their 
revenue decrease (Bowman, 2011). NPOs must be careful not to let their liabilities and 
expenses exceed their total revenue, as debt will become excessive and, potentially, 
thwart the NPO’s ability to fulfil its mission (Bowman, 2011). 
How NPOs Accumulate Profit 
 To help avoid this situation, the U.S. Better Business Bureau’s (BBB) Wise 
Giving Alliance guidelines on financial management in NPOs stated NPOs can 
accumulate profit but that this profit “…should not [emphasis added] be more than three 
times the size of the past year’s expenses or three times the size of the current year’s 
budget, whichever is higher” (Give.org, n.d.). This is very interesting. The BBB could 
have easily placed limitations on the amount of profit NPOs may generate, but they 
instead qualified their statement with the words “should not,” thereby indicating there is 
no legal penalty or limit to the amount of profit NPOs can accumulate (Calabrese, 2012; 
Give.org). Drawing from research conducted in 1980 by Hansmann (as cited in 
Calabrese, 2012), Calabrese (2012) additionally pointed out the IRS made no 
specifications on how long NPOs may retain any such profit; rather, because of the IRS’s 
“nondistribution constraint,” Calabrese wrote no profit can be distributed “…to officers, 
directors, or management” (p. 301). Though the IRS’s nondistribution constraint implies 
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profit will be kept in the NPO to prevent members from syphoning money out of the 
budget (Calabrese, 2012), the IRS did not stipulate how much profit a NPO can 
accumulate. Instead of discouraging NPOs from making profit, the BBB and IRS permit 
NPOs to grow as large (if not larger) as their for-profit counter-parts, so long as they 
abide by certain regulations (Calabrese, 2012).   
But there are very few regulations the BBB (Give.org, n.d), the IRS (n.d.), and 
Charity Navigator (2016) require NPOs to abide by if they are to keep their 501(c) (3) 
status. These regulation are 1) NPOs must not lobby or give to “private shareholder[s] or 
individual[s]” (IRS, n.d.); 2) they must “Spend at least 65% of [their] total expenses on 
program activities” (Give.org, n.d.); and 3) they must “Spend no more than 35% of 
related contributions on fund raising” (Give.org, n.d.). What these regulations boil down 
to, however, is NPOs that generate profit that is not in excess of three years-worth of 
spending or budget, and spend at least 65% on services and “no more than 35%... on 
fundraising” (Give.org, n.d.) will never be in violation of accumulating profit (Calabrese, 
2012). Since NPOs typically meet these regulations by spending 90% of their revenue on 
service expenses, they often leave the remaining 10% to fund administration, fundraising 
events, and profit accumulation (Charity Navigator, 2016). Accordingly, if their revenue 
is $300,000, only $30,000 (10% of $300,000) is left over to support the administrator(s) 
and their fundraising efforts. 
It should be noted that while saving only 10% of their revenue seems 
spectacularly low, it is only low in NPOs that make less than $500,000. These 
organizations are able to generate $50,000 to $100,000 toward their administrative and 
fundraising fees without being in violation of any authoritative regulation. What is more, 
8 
 
 
if an NPO’s annual revenue is over $200 million (which is not an uncommon number to 
find in the nonprofit sector) they will save about $20 million without being in violation of 
IRS, BBB, or Give.org regulations (Calabrese, 2012). However, if it costs such NPOs 
less than $20 million to pay administrative and fundraising expenses, they will have no 
choice but to allocate whatever profit is left over into their profit margin. As long as this 
allocated amount does not exceed three year’s worth of revenue or budget needed to pay 
operational costs, such NPOs will continually receive an A or A- rating from charity 
watchdogs (Give.org).  
It is in this way that many of the larger NPOs have been able to continually add to 
their overall amount of profit (as indicated they would by Calabrese [2012; 2013] and 
Ramirez (2011)) by generating enough profit to grow, some in excess of $100 million. 
There is nothing inherently wrong with NPOs growing to such a large size. The problem 
these NPOs face, rather, is justifying the amount of profit they have accumulated 
(Calabrese, 2012). It turns out a good way of doing this is by increasing the amount of 
money being put into overall expenses (i.e., paying higher salaries and adding additional 
services), that way it will take a larger amount of money to pay for three year’s worth of 
operational costs (Give.org, n.d.). All NPOs have to do to generate profit without 
violating their 501(c) 3 status is to save three times the amount of money then need to 
provide services each year, which is arguably how the nonprofit sector grew to the size it 
has ($2.99 trillion by 2012) without having to drain their financial reserves (Ramirez, 
2011). 
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The Situation of Most NPOs 
 Most NPOs can only dream of making enough revenue to sufficiently pay for 
their operations and expenses, let alone generate surplus profit (Bowman, 2011). A 
considerable amount of literature suggests most NPOs do not even keep enough profit to 
cover their basic expenses for the minimum three month requirement (Bowman, 2011), 
but this does not mean they will spend what profit they have on services if their source of 
revenue suddenly becomes unstable (Calabrese, 2012a; Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; 
Thomas & Trafford, 2012). In fact, some evidence exists that suggests NPOs may have 
allocated more revenue toward their profit margin than their services to continue with 
their operations. Such NPOs would most likely have over $500,000 in assets (Courtney 
Vletas, personal communication, November 18, 2016). The time period in which it seems 
likely that some of them may have done this was at the peak of the Great Recession from 
2009 to 2010. It was during this time that NPOs faced less in donor support and 
government funding, yet somehow the entire sector grew, adding additional NPOs at a 
time when, arguably, it would be harder to do so (Brown, McKeever, Dietz, Koulish, & 
Pollak, 2013).  
Evidence from the Great Recession 
 Brown et al. (2013) found that during the Great Recession NPOs with over 
$50,000 in revenue were more likely to cut services and “…take other drastic steps” than 
close their doors (p. 5). What is more, the percentage of NPOs during this time period 
with over $50,000 in revenue decreased by only 5%, a loss of 12,831 NPOs (267,331 – 
254,500) (Brown et al., 2013). This means 95% of the NPOs with over $50,000 in 
revenue were able to survive and maintain at least this level of revenue by, supposedly, 
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cutting services and taking “…other drastic steps” (Brown et al., 2013, p. 5). However, if 
some of these NPOs had a sufficient profit margin before their revenue started 
decreasing, they may have cut their services to maintain or try to keep this level of 
finances, possibly because of imminent, future financial uncertainty (Brown et al., 2013). 
This is a possibility that is normally ruled out because of its association with the way for-
profit organizations behave (Mitchell, 2015; Ramirez, 2011). Yet because such little 
research has been conducted on profit accumulation in NPOs (Calabrese, 2012), it is not 
certain NPOs did not act this way during this time.   
A study conducted by the Urban Institute indicated that despite some small set-
backs, overall, the nonprofit sector grew by 8.6% from 2002 to 2012, which includes the 
before and aftermath years of the Great Recession (Brown et al., 2013; McKeever & 
Pterrijohn, 2014; Ramirez, 2011). What is interesting, though, is the Urban Institute 
found $12.86 billion less was given to NPOs from 2002 to 2012 ($348.03 - $335.17) 
(McKeever & Pterrijohn, 2014). In other words, the nonprofit sector received $12.86 
billion less in total financial support (to include individuals, businesses, and foundations) 
between 2002 and 2012, yet by 2012 it grew 8.6% (McKeever & Pterrijohn, 2014). 
However, in order for it to have grown while receiving less financial support the 
nonprofit sector had to have set money aside for its long-term survival; otherwise, the 
total number of NPOs would be significantly less (Mckeever & Pterrijohn, 2014; 
Ramirez, 2011). Instead, an additional 123,840 NPOs arose from 2002 to 2012, thus 
bringing the total number of NPOs filing taxes to 1.44 million, or an increase of 8.6% 
(123,480/1,440,000 ) from 2002 to 2012 (McKeever & Pterrijohn, 2014).  
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Additionally, researchers found the overall cash holdings (profit) by the nonprofit 
sector grew from “$801 billion in 1997 to $1.7 trillion” by 2007 (Ramirez, 2011, p. 675), 
and that by 2013 total assets (to include cash holdings) in NPOs came to $3.22 trillion 
(McKeever & Pterrijohn, 2014). It was also found that employment in NPOs grew during 
this time by 8.5%, which is only .01% less than the rate by which this sector grew 
(Markowitz, 2016). Though this suggests service offerings remained relatively 
unaffected, because this is a general statistic of the entire NPO population, much of this 
growth could be smaller NPOs that were just beginning to grow (Monthly Labor Review, 
February 2016). NPOs with revenue in excess of $500,000, therefore, could have chosen 
to retain their profit by taking drastic steps (i.e., cutting services) (Brown et al., 2013; 
Calabrese, 2012). It is possible they wanted to maintain their financial position, but it is 
more likely they believed the recession years were going to worsen their financial 
position, and so they may have planned accordingly (Brown et al., 2013; Calabrese, 
2012). As such, it is worthwhile to examine how NPOs with revenue in excess of 
$500,000 (since these NPOs would be more likely to have financial reserves) were 
affected during the Great Recession of 2007-09 (Brown et al., 2013; Ramirez, 2011). 
They may have weathered these years by allocating more revenue toward profit 
accumulation than services (Calabrese, n.d.; Ramirez, 2011). 
The Present Study’s Goal 
In essence, researchers found that while the nonprofit sector experienced an 
overall growth of 8.6%, they also found $12.86 billion less was given in total donor 
support to NPOs from 2002 to 2012 (McKeever & Pterrijohn, 2014). However, due to the 
scant amount of research on profit accumulation in NPOs (Calabrese, 2012), it has 
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usually been assumed that in order to make up for receiving this much less in total 
donations, NPOs that accumulated profit during this time used it to continue offering the 
same amount of services (Calabrese, n.d.; Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Tuckman & Chang, 
1991). This may not be what happened. If the nonprofit sector grew to $3.22 trillion 
while receiving $12.86 billion less in funding, how were they able to do so without 
focusing more on accumulating profit? (Brown et al., 2013; Calabrese, 2012; Ramirez, 
2011). The present study’s goal is to contribute to researchers’ understanding of the ways 
NPOs survived by examining if NPOs accumulated profit during the peak years of the 
Great Recession, 2009 to 2010.  
Purpose of Study 
 The study’s purpose is to apply a systems theory to answer the research questions: 
1) did revenue increase or decrease for NPOs during recession years from 2009 and 2010; 
and 2) did some NPOs during this time allocate more money toward accumulating profit 
than service expenses? The lack of literature on this subject warrants further investigation 
(Francois, 2015). 
Definitions of Key Terms to be used in this Study 
 To avoid confusion on the meaning and use of certain technical terms used 
throughout this research study, this section will define what these terms are.  
The term Revenue defined the total amount of cash NPOs receive each year as reported 
on their IRS 990 Form, to include total donor support (Bowman, 2011). The term Profit 
defined excess revenue left over after all expenses are accounted for. As will be further 
clarified in the literature review, the term Financial Reserves defined the percentage of 
revenue with which NPOs have to run their operations. This research study will use two 
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financial ratios given by Tuckman and Chang (1991) to determine this percentage. It is 
crucial to note that since financial reserves only take into consideration assets, liabilities, 
and expenses. Profit is what is available after these are accounted for. Financial reserves 
do not measure profit. Services Expenses, as previously mentioned, defined anything 
NPOs do to help clients (the people NPOs serve) with their problems. Service Expenses 
might seem like a difficult thing to measure and account for, due to the fact that they are 
not always documented; for the purposes of this study, services were measured simply by 
looking at what NPOs paid in total expenses toward programs and services in their IRS 
990 Forms. Without conducting an in-depth examination of service documentation in 
each NPO, this has been suggested as being the best way to determine the amount of 
money NPOs spent on their services (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000). Defining Service 
Expenses this way will also make it easier to examine a larger amount of NPOs in a 
timely manner.
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CHAPTER II 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review will first describe the financial tool ratio analysis and why it 
is important social workers understand this tool. It spells-out the logic behind Tuckman 
and Chang’s (1991) definition of financial reserves in NPOs and then used two of 
Tuckman and Chang’s financial ratios to later determine the amount of cash in an NPO’s 
financial reserves. The literature review will then examine the two most pertinent 
objections that have been raised against them. From here, the study used additional 
literature to apply an open-systems theory to answer why NPOs sometimes choose to 
drain their profit. This study did this by examining Emery and Trist’s (1963) open-
systems theory on the four causal environments NPOs operate in.  
Ratio Analysis as a Tool for Understanding Financial Reserves 
 In order to provide social workers with an adequate understanding of financial 
reserves, this literature review will now discuss an important tool social workers can use 
to help their organizations determine how much money they have in their reserves 
(Greenlee & Trussel, 2000). 
Unlike many human service professionals, social workers receive training on how 
they can help their agencies avoid having to cut services due to revenue depreciation 
(Blalack, 2016; Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Tuckman & Chang, 1991). An important 
financial tool social workers receive training on to help NPOs determine whether they are
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financially stable enough to continue paying expenses and providing services is ratio 
analysis (Tuckman & Chang, 1991). Though this tool is sometimes overlooked in the 
social work education curriculum, more and more educators and administrators are seeing 
the immense value it has in helping future practitioners (Charity Navigator, 2016). As 
such, making it available to social work students not only helps them become better 
practitioners but it also helps them see how they are part of a bigger picture when it 
comes to offering services in the mental health field. 
Ratio analysis familiarizes one with an NPO’s IRS 990 Form by providing simple 
math equations these Form’s line numbers can be entered into (Charity Navigator, 2016). 
For example, a debt to assets ratio is defined as “dividing total debt (the difference in 
revenues and spending) by total assets” (Revenue–Spending)/Total Assets (Hunter, 2014, 
p. 3). The closer the result of this equation is to 1 the better the NPO is able to use current 
assets to pay debt (Charity Navigator, 2016), which implies the further the result is from 
1 the less likely it can do so (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000). The debt to assets ratio is just 
one of many ratios practitioners can use to determine whether an NPO is financially 
stable enough to continue providing the same level/quality of services or whether it must 
start using financial reserves to do so (Charity Navigator, 2016; Tuckman & Chang, 
1991). It is up to the NPO to determine if the ratios indicate it is in danger of being 
unable to continue offering services or pay service and administrative expenses with 
revenue (Bowman, 2011; Charity Navigator, 2016; Tuckman & Chang, 1991). Financial 
ratios, nevertheless, offer social work practitioners a number of advantages they can use 
to make this determination (Charity Navigator, 2016; Tuckman & Chang, 1991).
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 The advantages of using ratio analysis to determine the financial shape are 1) to 
provide social work practitioners with a clearer understanding of the NPO’s financial 
status; 2) to tell social work practitioners if the NPO is in danger of having to cut services 
or will be unable to pay its expenses with revenue (Bowman, 2011; Charity Navigator, 
2016; Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Tuckman & Chang, 1991); and 3) to give social work 
practitioners a better overall understanding of how the NPO operates, which, in turn, 
helps practitioners better connect NPOs with their community (Prentice, 2015). Social 
work practitioners that are unable to properly use ratio analysis will be less likely to do 
these things and, as a result, will struggle with understanding how their services can reach 
larger audiences (Blalack, 2016; Carroll & Stater, 2008; Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; 
Sontag-Padill et al., 2012; Prentice, 2015; Tuckman & Chang, 1991). It is therefore 
indispensable that social worker practitioners educate themselves on using ratio analysis, 
so they can understand what an NPO needs to do to avoid situations where services must 
be cut (Tuckman & Chang, 1991).  
Having established the importance of ratio analysis, as well as demonstrating how 
it can be used by social workers, what led to (arguably) the four best and most often 
discussed financial ratios in the literature on NPOs will be presented (de Andrés-Alonso, 
Garcia-Rodriguez, & Romero-Merino, 2015; Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Tuckman & 
Chang, 1991). It is hoped that an understanding of these four financial ratios will give 
social workers insight on how to determine NPOs have enough in their financial reserves 
in case of emergencies. As previously mentioned, this study will use two of these ratios 
as determinants of financial reserves in NPOs. This is to simplify the study, as well as 
help provide researchers with a new way of applying Tuckman and Chang’s study to 
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NPO financial management. It also is hoped that this research will additionally keep 
Tuckman and Chang’s classic research on financial management in NPOs alive in 
researchers’ minds. 
Tuckman and Chang 
 The topic of what ratios can be used to determine an NPO has sufficient funds in 
its reserves has been discussed in a variety of forms throughout the literature regarding 
NPOs since at least 1991(de Andrés-Alonso et al., 2015; Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; 
Prentice, 2015; Tuckman & Chang, 1991). Prior to that time researchers in the for-profit 
sector developed financial ratios that informed organizations if they were in danger of 
having to file bankruptcy; these researchers were Beaver (1966) and Altman (1968) 
(Tuckman & Chang, 1991; Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Woods, 2011). The “inherent 
modeling flaw” in using bankruptcy filing as an indicator of an NPO’s financial reserve 
status, though, is by law these organizations “…cannot be legally forced into liquidation 
or reorganization” (Simon, Dale, & Chisolm, 2006; Prentice, 2015, p. 3; 11 U.S.C.A § 
303 (a)). Rather, NPOs may file bankruptcy simply to “thwart a labor dispute,” or to 
change names, or for a variety of reasons having nothing to do with whether their 
financial reserves are sufficient to pay operational costs (Greenlee & Trussel, 1991, p. 
201; Prentice, 2015). It is for these reasons future researchers decided to look for more 
accurate descriptions and ways of determining NPOs had sufficient financial reserves on 
hand (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Prentice, 2015; Tuckman & Chang, 1991). 
Tuckman and Chang’s Four Financial Ratios 
 The most notable undertaking of this task was conducted in 1991 by Tuckman 
and Chang, who argued that NPOs were unable to withstand severe depreciation (or 
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financial shock) in their revenue are likely to “immediately” cut their services (p. 445). 
Tuckman and Chang supported this argument by developing a conceptual framework that 
predicts when an NPO will become financially vulnerable to revenue depreciation. 
Known as the Four Operational Criteria (FOC), this conceptual framework uses four 
quintiles that rank from high to low an NPO’s ability to withstand severe financial shock 
(e.g. the closer an NPO’s quintile ranking is to 1 the better it can withstand financial 
shock (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Bowman, 2011)).  
These four quintiles are listed as follows: 
1. Inadequate Equity Balances  
Subtracting liabilities from Assets (restricted/unrestricted accounts and liquid cash), and 
then dividing by total revenue:  
(Assets–Liabilities)/Total Revenue 
represents available revenue for dealing with financial shock. The numerator in the 
Inadequate Equity Balance equation is Tuckman and Chang’s definition of equity. 
2. Revenue Concentration 
The sum of revenue sources divided by total revenue squared: 
Ʃ (Revenue Sourceɉ) ²/Total Revenue 
represents an NPO’s susceptibility to financial shock should its revenue sources start 
becoming eliminated, what is known as a Herfindahl Index.  
3. Low Administrative Costs 
Dividing administrative expenses by total expenses: 
Administrative Expenses/Total Expenses 
represents how much in administrative expenses can be used to combat financial shock. 
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4. Low or Negative Operating Margins     
Subtracting expenditures from revenues, and then dividing by revenues: 
(Revenues–Expenses) = Total Surplus/Revenue 
is the percentage an NPO’s Net Income (NI) represents its revenue. This percentage is the 
total surplus available to offset declines in revenue due to financial shock (Tuckman & 
Chang). 
The Four Ratios as Determinants of an NPO’s Financial Reserves 
NPOs ranking low in any one quintile are “at-risk” of not providing the same 
amount or quality of services after a financial shock, whereas NPOs ranking low in all 
four quintiles are “severely-at-risk” of not providing the same amount or quality of 
services after a financial shock (Tuckman & Chang, 1991, p. 451; Bowman, 2011). 
Conversely, NPOs with high quintile rankings have more flexibility in their finances, and 
so, it can be reasoned, are unlikely to “…reduce [their] service offerings” (Greenlee & 
Trussel, 2000, p. 200; Tuckman & Chang).  Spelling out the logic: 
1) if low quintile rankings predict an NPO will cut services;  
2) and cutting services after experiencing financial shock indicates an NPO lacks 
sufficient funds to continue operations as normal;  
3) then low quintile rankings are good indicators that an NPO has insufficient 
funds in its financial reserves for surviving a financial shock, and vice-versa 
(Prentice, 2015; Tuckman & Chang, 1991). 
High quintile rankings, on the other hand, cannot be used as predictors of services being 
cut because these NPOs always have the option of either cutting services or depleting 
their financial reserves (Calabrese, 2012). Therefore, since replication studies after 
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Tuckman and Chang only tested whether low quintile rankings predict services would be 
cut, it remains to be seen whether NPOs with high quintile rankings deplete financial 
reserves to maintain the same level of service offerings (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000). To 
this researcher’s knowledge, this assumption has never been tested. It has been implied 
(most notably by Tuckman and Chang, 1991) that NPOs with high quintile rankings 
would use their accumulated profit after experiencing a financial shock to maintain the 
same level of services. The easiest way of verifying this is by examining NPOs during the 
great recession to see if, despite experiencing an increased demand for services, they 
allocate more revenue toward accumulating profit. Verifying the validity of this 
possibility is of utmost importance, then, to the study of financial management in NPOs. 
Finding evidence against it might change some of the views researchers have on how 
NPOs sometimes manage their finances. 
Nevertheless, Tuckman and Chang’s (1991) study on financial vulnerability made 
two important contributions to the literature on financial management in NPOs. First, 
their study provided researchers with four financial ratios that determined how well 
NPOs could continue providing services if their revenue suddenly started depreciating 
(Tuckman & Chang, 1991). Second, they demonstrated the likelihood of services being 
cut can be predicted by the quintile rankings of these four financial ratios (Tuckman & 
Chang, 1991). It naturally follows that quintile rankings may accurately inform NPOs of 
how much they have available in their financial reserves. However, empirical support is 
needed to show NPOs with low quintile rankings gradually begin cutting services; 
otherwise, these rankings may not be as accurate in informing NPOs of what they have 
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available in their reserves as some researchers would like to think (Bowman, 2011; 
Greenlee & Trussel, 2000). 
Empirical Support for the Four Quintiles 
Greenlee and Trussel (2000) conducted one of the first major empirical studies to 
test whether low quintile ratings predict NPOs will cut services (Tuckman & Chang, 
1991). Greenlee and Trussel did this by comparing program expenses of NPOs with low 
quintile rankings (from 1985-1995) with NPOs from the same time period with normal to 
high quintile rankings. Greenlee and Trussel’s study found NPOs with lower quintile 
rankings in three quintiles (2, 3, and 4) consistently spent less in program expenses, as 
reported on IRS Form 990 (please see Table 1) (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000). This meant 
ranking low in three quintiles can negatively affect an NPO’s ability to continue 
providing the same amount of services (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000). Greenlee and 
Trussel’s findings were important for two reasons: 1) they empirically supported 
Tuckman and Chang’s argument that NPOs with low quintile rankings are likely to cut 
services; and 2) they provided empirical evidence that high quintile rankings might 
explain why some NPOs do not need to cut their services (Prentice, 2015). 
Table 1 
 
Quintile Rankings for NPOs over a three-year period 
 NPOs Over a Three-Year Period Quintile Ranking 
Inadequate Equity Balance: 0.875 
Revenue Concentration: 0.625 
Low Administrative Costs: 0.100 
Low or Negative Operating 
Margins: 
0.250 
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It can therefore be expected that NPOs with low quintile rankings from 2007 to 
2010 experienced a decline in the amount of services being offered, but it is not 
necessarily true that NPOs that had high quintile rankings, and thus were able to use their 
surplus revenue to accumulate profit, during this time increased their amount of service 
offerings (Tuckman & Chang, 1991). Since these NPOs may also cut their services, an 
examination of NPOs with high quintile rankings may yield contrary information to what 
researchers have normally expected such NPOs to do (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; 
Calabrese, n.d.). The importance of examining these NPOs lies in verifying whether 
researchers’ assumptions on how they deal with revenue deprecation are correct. 
However, it is entirely possible that there is no relationship between revenue 
depreciation, financial reserves, and service offerings in NPOs with high quintile 
rankings. This literature review will now discuss the possibility that an extraneous 
variable could better explain why these NPOs might be able to retain their services and 
financial reserves, even if their revenue depreciates (Bowman, 2011). 
Bowman’s Disagreement with Tuckman and Chang 
 Tuckman and Chang, of course, only set out to identify when an NPO is in danger 
of cutting services, to which researchers agree was a successful venture (Greenlee & 
Trussel, 2000). By doing so, Tuckman and Chang provided NPOs with four financial 
ratios that could determine if their current revenue was sufficient enough to provide 
services after it depreciated (Tuckman & Chang, 1991). Greenlee and Trussel tested these 
four financial ratios and found that over time (three years) NPOs with lower quintile 
rankings gradually began cutting services (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000). It can therefore be 
assumed that NPOs that do not cut, or increase, their services have higher quintile 
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rankings, but this is not necessarily true (Bowman, 2011). The late Woods Bowman, for 
example, presents a case in which NPOs with low quintile rankings will still be able to 
provide the same level of services. 
Possible Extraneous Variable 
 Not all researchers agree low quintile rankings indicate there is a strong likelihood 
that an NPO will cut its services (Bowman, 2011). Bowman implied that because some 
NPOs are able to finance expenses with debt they do not need to set anything aside in 
their profit margin. Increasing debt, then, is an extraneous variable that may better 
explain why NPOs retain their financial reserves and service offerings (Bowman, 2011; 
Tuckman & Chang, 1991). These NPOs can continue offering the same amount of 
services, regardless of their profit margin, by simply letting their debt increase (Bowman, 
2011; Tuckman & Chang, 1991). In relation to this study, if these NPOs offer services 
without using profit, then a reduction in their revenue may have no effect on the amount 
of services they provide (Calabrese, n.d.). NPOs, in other words, they do not need to 
worry about accumulating profit because it is possible to continue providing services, 
even if revenue begins depreciating (Bowman, 2011). Therefore, if NPOs can avoid 
cutting services and draining their profit when their revenue starts depreciating, then 
NPOs may not need to cut their services to preserve their profit margin.   
The reason why some NPOs can maintain both their service and their profit 
margin when their revenue depreciates, though, is their debt collectors are willing to put 
up with the additional amount of debt they accumulate (Bowman, 2011). This is not 
necessarily a problem. To clarify, it does not take much insight or experience in working 
with NPOs to realize some of their supporters believe so strongly in the mission that they 
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will do all they can to support the NPO (Charles & Kim, 2016; Grizzle, 2015). In fact, 
research supports the argument that funders are more likely to help NPOs that have less 
accumulated profit (de Andrés-Alonso et al., 2015). These funders believe NPOs that 
struggle with finances are doing all they can to support their mission and so view their 
struggle as an indication of the importance of the NPO’s mission (de Andrés-Alonso et 
al, 2015). As such, if debt collectors also feel this way, then they may be willing to 
tolerate the amount of debt that is being generated by certain NPOs (Bowman, 2011). 
While it may be burdensome on funders and debt collectors to continue offering 
financial support in these situations, as long as they continue doing so the NPO will not 
need to worry about their financial reserves or cutting services (Bowman, 2011; de 
Andrés-Alonso et al., 2015). NPOs might use this kind of support to pay service and 
employee expenses, and, as a result, they will avoid having to cut services or drain their 
profit margin (Calabrese, n.d.). Again, this does not seem like something NPOs would 
do, but if they determine that they need their reserves to continue operating in the future, 
it is something they might do (Calabrese; Mitchell, 2015). Therefore, because Bowman’s 
disagreement with Tuckman and Chang (1991) is valid, spelling out his argument against 
using Tuckman and Chang’s financial ratios as indicators of their ability to pay services 
may provide an alternative way of understanding how NPOs use their financial reserves. 
In any case, doing so should give stronger reasons for or against using Tuckman and 
Chang’s FOC as a dependent variable that can be affected by revenue fluctuation. 
Bowman’s Argument 
 The trouble with using quintile rankings as an indication of an NPO’s ability to 
provide services is they do not take into consideration how inflation affects an NPO’s 
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long-term financial sustainability (Bowman, 2011; Greenlee & Trussel, 2000). Bowman 
argued an NPO’s long-term financial sustainability is determined more by its ability to 
keep its assets from depreciating below the national inflation rate—which from 1920-
2006 was 3.4%. NPOs unable to do this will consistently receive a lower Return on 
Assets (ROA) rate than what is needed to remain financially stable in the long-term 
(Bowman, 2011). To illustrate, NPOs scoring an “astonishingly low” 0.13 (p. 41) on the 
Inadequate Equity Balance quintile (see Table 2): 
Net Assets: $2,790/Total Assets: $20,994 = .13 
but have an ROA rate of 3.2%: 
ROA = 100% (line 73B – line 73A)/line 59B, or 
ROA = 100% ($2,790 - $2,123/$20,994) = 3.2% 
are only 0.2% (3.4% - 3.2%) away from keeping their assets from depreciating below the 
national 3.4% inflation rate (Bowman, 2011). These NPOs need very little (about 0.2%) 
in comparison to NPOs that consistently need more revenue to keep their ROA rate from 
depreciating below the national inflation rate of 3.4% (Bowman, 2011). Bowman’s point 
is an NPO’s ROA rate contributes more to its long-term financial sustainability than its 
quintile rankings (Tuckman & Chang, 1994). Table 2 used and taken from Bowman’s 
2011 research. 
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Table 2 
 
Activity Data (in $1,000) 
 
Assets      2007       2006 
Cash and cash equivalents $1,584 
1,5841,5
$567 
Other current assets ,006 7,983 
Investments 748 5,708 
Property, plant, and equipment 9,650 5,586 
Other assets 1,081 0 
Total assets $20,993 $19,844 
Liabilities 
Current liabilities $3,272 $3,348 
Mortgages, bonds, and notes 9,417 9,047 
Other liabilities 4,481 5,325 
Total liabilities $18,204 $17,720 
Net assets (unrestricted) $2,790 $2,123 
Total liabilities and net assets          $20,994          $19,843    
Supplemental Activity Data      2007 2006 
Expenses before depreciation $52,391 $40,330 
Depreciation $744 $480 
 
The Problem with Bowman’s argument 
 Bowman (2011) assumed NPOs unable to keep their ROA rate above the current 
rate of inflation will have to pay more in total liabilities and net assets each year. The 
problem with Bowman’s assumption is it is not necessarily the case that NPOs must use 
hard assets (Property, Plant, and Equipment) to pay liabilities (Bowman, 2011). In fact, 
depreciation in the value of these particular assets only affects NPOs that use them to pay 
liabilities; it does not affect NPOs who otherwise choose to pay liabilities with revenue 
(Bowman, 2011). Therefore, since the ROA rate of these latter NPOs may fall well below 
the national rate of inflation without affecting their ability to pay liabilities, ROA rates 
are only applicable in cases where NPOs pay liabilities with hard assets (Bowman, 2011; 
Prentice, 2015; Tuckman & Chang, 1991). Since most NPOs have few assets to use as 
27 
 
 
collateral anyways, Bowman’s argument mainly applies to larger NPOs that pay 
liabilities with hard assets. 
 Nevertheless, Bowman (2011) brings up a valid point that NPOs should consider 
ROA rates when determining their financial reserves are sufficient to help them continue 
providing services. NPOs that do not may be unable to finance their debt with their hard 
assets and will generate more and more debt over time if they use hard assets to finance 
debt (Bowman, 2011). However, it seems NPOs avoided using hard assets to finance debt 
during the Great Recession because instead of there being an overall depreciation in the 
total value of NPOs, the entire sector grew from $1.7 trillion in liquid assets to $3.22 
trillion in total assets from 2007 to 2013 (Ramirez, 2011). Since it is unlikely this sector 
would have been able to make such a gain during this time had they continued financing 
debt with hard assets, the extraneous variable financing expenses with debt does not seem 
to have played a significant part in influencing the behavior of NPOs (Bowman). This 
extraneous variable, in other words, is not significant enough to explain why some NPOs 
with high quintile rankings may have cut services to retain their profit margin. 
Instead of taking Bowman’s argument to mean quintile rankings are less 
important in helping NPOs determine the status of profit margin, researchers should 
remember inflation only affects an NPO’s hard assets, if it chooses to use those assets to 
finance debt (Bowman, 2011). Since it does not affect the amount of available cash in an 
NPO’s financial reserves, and Tuckman and Chang’s (1991) quintile rankings mainly 
deal with available cash in these reserves, Bowman’s objection that quintile ranking do 
not take into consideration ROA rates is unwarranted. Rather, inflation largely affects 
NPOs that use hard assets to pay liabilities with, but because these NPOs did not create 
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enough debt to affect the overall growth of the nonprofit sector, debt is not expected to 
play a significant role in explaining the relationship between revenue, service expenses, 
and profit/debt. Instead, the literature on NPOs suggests a better explanation of this 
possible relationship is the idea that these NPOs were simply planning for an unstable 
financial future (Brown et al., 2013). This research study, nevertheless, will test the 
hypothesis that NPOs increased their debt to maintain the same level of services; that way 
it can be verified that the literature is correct that NPOs during this time period did not 
rely on debt to avoid cutting services.    
Before outlining a systems theory to explain why NPOs might cut services to 
keep their profit margin in tack, or increase their profit margin faster than their service 
expenses, Prentice’s (2015) argument against Tuckman and Chang’s (1991) financial 
ratios will be presented. Overcoming Prentice’s objection will provide ample support for 
positing that a relationship exists between revenue, service expenses, financial reserves, 
and profit/debt. The study will then examine Emery and Trist’s (1963) open-systems 
theory to identify the type of environment NPOs operated in during the recession years. 
Prentice’s Argument Against Tuckman and Chang 
 It seems natural that the traditional factors Tuckman and Chang (1991) used to 
determine the likelihood that an NPO will cut services can also be used to determine 
whether an NPO will pay total liabilities and expenses with revenue at a future time. 
Prentice (2016) argued these traditional factors cannot be used to do this, however, 
because they are only indicators of an NPO’s current financial situation. The main gist of 
Prentice’s argument can be summed up as follows: because the traditional factors only 
inform NPOs of how well they financially performed in the past, they can only determine 
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the likelihood that an NPO will continue performing this way in the future. However, if 
they cannot be taken to mean an NPO will continue to maintain its level of service 
offerings and profit/debt, then revenue may not affect service offerings and profit margin 
in NPOs (Prentice, 2015). An NPO’s ability to offer services may be more affected by 
something else.  
It is important to note that Prentice (2015) is instead that suggesting service 
offerings and profit/debt are more affected by environmental factors, such as “gross 
domestic product and state product [, and] median household income” (p. 828). While 
this may be true, it is beyond the scope of this study to test how these factors affect 
NPOs. Rather, this study will see how NPOs have dealt with revenue fluctuation itself, 
instead of examining the causes of revenue fluctuation and financial performance 
(Prentice, 2015). Before moving on to the methodology section to describe how this will 
be done, the literature review will now examine a plausible theory for explaining why 
NPOs might hold on to their profit margin when their revenue depreciates (Ramirez, 
2011). This should provide a thorough understanding of why NPOs might do this, as well 
as providing a link between social work theory and real-life choices in NPOs. 
Open-Systems Approach for Why NPOs Retain Profit 
One of the most difficult situations Nonprofit Organizations (NPOs) must deal 
with is deciding what to do when their revenue suddenly starts depreciating (Tuckman & 
Chang, 1991). A number of possible options are available for NPOs in such situations: 1) 
they can use what money they have saved up to compensate for the sudden financial loss 
(Tuckman & Chang, 1991); 2) they can begin cutting services to avoid spending 
additional money they have saved up; or 3) they can do nothing, in which case they either 
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hope to find additional funding, or they simply allow their debt to increase (Bowman, 
2011). It is generally assumed NPOs in these tough financial situations will go for option 
1 (Bowman, 2011; Tuckman & Chang, 1991); however, sometimes the best option is to 
cut services in lieu of spending whatever money has been saved up. The argument is 
doing so puts them in a better financial position to prepare for additional financial 
difficulties—and that this is necessary if they want to continue offering services in the 
future. 
 There are compelling reasons both for and against NPOs cutting services in lieu 
of spending money they have saved up. The most primary reason has to do with being 
able to continue paying service expenses in the long-run (Bowman, 2011). Many times 
NPOs will make sacrifices, so they can continue offering services to larger populations, 
which often means they must drain what finances they have saved up. On the other hand, 
NPOs may realize that the environment they are in dictates that they must retain their 
financial reserves in order to survive at all (Emery & Trist, 1963). Though NPOs in this 
situation seem to operate more in accordance with their for-profit counterparts 
(Calabrese, n.d.), they are actually better adapting themselves to their external 
environment (Emery & Trist, 1963).  
Looking at the situation from an open-systems perspective, then, suggests NPOs 
sometimes cut their services in lieu of spending their financial reserves because they are 
adapting to their external environment (Emery & Trist, 1963). To put this in the most 
simple and easy to understand language: NPOs that realize their funding sources are 
going to start becoming less available, but want to continue providing some level of 
services, might cut their services instead of using their accumulated profit to provide the 
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same level of services (Calabrese, 2012). These NPOs might realize that in order to 
survive they must retain their accumulated profit because their funding sources will 
become less and less available, and so will cut their services and not drain their 
accumulated profit (Mitchell, 2015). Instead of viewing this as something for-profit 
organizations do (Calabrese, 2012), it is possible these NPOs are simply better adjusting 
themselves to their external environment (Emery & Trist). 
Description of the Four Environments NPOs Operate in 
Emery and Trist (1963) provided four descriptions of the overall external 
environment NPOs operate in, which are listed and described as follows: 
Placid Randomization Environment: This environmental texture is best 
characterized as one in which there is no governmental control or order. There is no point 
for NPOs to develop a strategy or a tactic on how to survive because there is literally no 
point. NPOs must instead fend for themselves by planning for the unexpected, taking 
advantage of every opportunity they can—a sort of survival of the fittest environment. 
Placid Cluster Environment: In a placid cluster environment, NPOs can use 
tactics and strategies to determine trends in funding sources and service needs because 
there is now a steady amount of order and regulation in the environment they operate in 
(e.g., predictions can be made as to what types of funding will be available; the future is 
very predictable). 
Distributive-Reactive Environment: The change between a Placid Cluster 
Environment and a Distributive-Reactive Environment is now there is competition 
between organizations for funding and services. This means NPOs must deal with 
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additional legislation and regulation in order to obtain funding, as well as the persistence 
of other NPOs competing for the same resources.   
Turbulent Field: A turbulent field is perhaps the most accurate description of the 
environment today’s NPOs operate in. Emery and Trist describe it as a field in which the 
ground itself that a NPO works in is shaking from the turbulence created from the other 
three environments. To illustrate, imagine an NPO is represented by a rat working its way 
across a table to get a piece of cheese. The rat must watch out for obstacles (i.e. 
government regulation), and other rats (competition); however, what makes this highly 
complicated is the table itself is shaking; in the same way, NPOs must deal with all these 
obstacles and the turbulence they create (Tom Winter, personal communication, May, 
2014). 
The purpose of discussing Emery and Trist’s (1963) four environmental textures 
is that they represent two polar extremes NPOs swing between, much like a pendulum. 
This is important to note because the type of environmental texture NPOs are in may 
determine the type of decisions they make. For example, NPOs in a Placid Cluster 
Environment are more able to predict what type of funding they will receive, would be 
less likely to cut their services due to financial uncertainty (Emery & Trist, 1963). NPOs 
in a Placid Randomization Environment, however, would be more concerned with basic 
survival and so might see the benefit of cutting their services in lieu of draining their 
accumulated profit because if they do not, they may be in a worse position (Emery & 
Trist, 1963). As such, Emery and Trist’s four environmental textures provide an excellent 
framework for the type of decisions NPOs must make to adapt to their external 
environment. 
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This study proposes NPOs from 2009 to 2010 operated in an extremely 
unpredictable environment, much like a Placid Randomization Environment, and that 
sometimes the best choice for them to make in this environment is to cut services in lieu 
of using their accumulated profit (Brown et al., 2013; Ramirez, 2011). Known as an 
open-systems approach to revenue fluctuation in NPOs, this study proposes NPOs that 
choose to do so are simply adjusting themselves to their external environment (Mitchell, 
2015). If this is true, then it can be expected that NPOs during this time resorted to 
making such decisions because doing so was their best option for surviving. In fact, based 
on Greenlee and Trussel’s (2000) research, it is reasonable to suspect that NPOs that did 
not do this become more susceptible to financial failure, and as a result, may have had to 
close their door permanently. It is altogether possible that such NPOs may have set an 
example, or a warning, that NPOs that operate in uncertain environments have a better 
chance at survival if they hold on to their financial reserves. 
Brief Reiteration and Objection to the Placid Randomization Environment  
To briefly reiterate, ratio analysis is an important tool social workers can use to 
determine what NPOs have available in their financial reserves. Tuckman and Chang 
(1991) developed four of the most empirically supported financial ratios that can be used 
for doing this. One of the arguments against using these financial ratios to determine 
what is financially available in reserves essentially said NPOs simply amass more and 
more debt each year—which implies they might increase their financial reserves faster 
than their service expenses (Bowman, 2011). As spelled out in the introduction, since the 
nonprofit sector has been steadily growing since at least 1997 (Ramirez, 2011), much of 
this debt would have to have prevented such growth (Brown et al., 2013). It follows that 
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in order for the nonprofit sector to have grown as much as it did it had to have held on to 
much of it financial reserves, especially since it received less in donor support from 2002 
to 2012 (McKeever & Pterrijohn, 2014).  
Since the nonprofit sector received less in donor support, but grew to a larger size, 
it is likely that in order for it to have done so some NPOs in the sector cut their services 
in lieu of draining their financial reserves or profit (Mitchell, 2015). This kind of 
behavior is normally thought to be exemplified by for-profit organizations, but since 
NPOs may have done this to better adapt themselves to their external environment, an 
open-systems theory can explain why they may have done so (Emery & Trist, 1963). Put 
simply, adjusting to their environment (Calabrese, n.d.) caused them to cut services in 
lieu of draining their profit margin. It was also found that the type of environment NPOs 
operated in can be characterized as a Placid Randomization Environment, meaning they 
had to take extreme measures to survive (Emery & Trist, 1963). However, it can also be 
argued to be classified as a Turbulent Field. This is because NPOs did not just have 
random income sources; they also dealt with competition from other NPOs over scarce 
resources, as well as having to abide by additional governmental regulation (Emery & 
Trist, 1963). 
What Emery and Trist (1963) mean by a Turbulent Field, however, is one in 
which governmental control, and competition by other organizations, is making it 
extremely difficult for NPOs to fulfil their individual missions. It turns out that the 
solution to this problem is for NPOs to work together by formulating an agreed upon set 
of values, such as taking into consideration another NPO’s need for survival, so that, 
overall, all NPOs can promote the well-being of society (Blalack, 2016). Working 
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together by using a collective set of values, as opposed to an individualist or survival of 
the fittest set of values, therefore, was argued by Emery and Trist to be how NPOs (and 
all organizations) can create a market environment that is conducive to the well-being of 
society. To reiterate, a marketplace in which each NPO (or organization) is ruthlessly 
placing their own needs above the needs of all other NPOs is one that will surely create a 
Turbulent Field (Emery & Trist, 1963). That is why Emery and Trist eventually argued 
that in order for the marketplace to properly function there must be an agreed upon set of 
values each organization abides by. The most likely set of values for this would be 
collective ones that allow all organizations to work together.  
It does not seem tenable to posit that during the recession NPOs could work 
together according to an agreed-upon set of values. To clarify, in order for NPOs to have 
worked together in this environment, they would have had to share their resources in a 
way that was fair and conducive to the survival of each NPO. Since there were fewer 
resources for NPOs to share, though, it would have been impossible for them to work 
according to such a set of values (Brown et al., 2013). Instead, NPOs during this time 
were in a tough position to where they had to make extreme, and drastic (Brown et al.), 
decisions, such as cutting services and “…other drastic steps” to avoid closing their doors 
(p. 5). It is therefore hard to imagine NPOs during this time could both work together by 
sharing resources that promoted an agreed upon set of values if in order to survive they 
had to take such drastic measures. Because such drastic measures preclude them from 
abiding by this set of values, and this value set is what NPOs need to abide by to operate 
in a Turbulent Field, it stands to reason that NPOs during this time did not operate in a 
Turbulent Field. The more reasonable conclusion is due to the unpredictable nature of the 
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environment they operated in, they were in a Placid Randomization Environment. Such 
an environment, arguably, better explains why an NPO might 1) cut services in lieu of 
draining their financial reserves; and 2) build their financial reserves faster than their 
service expenses when revenue increases. 
 Summary of the Arguments 
 Based on the literature, there are five arguments that describe what NPOs might 
do when their revenue fluctuates. These arguments do no predict what NPOs will do; 
rather, they describe what NPOs have done in an unstable external environment. 
1) The first argument is based on Calabrese (2012) and Ramirez (2011):  
When revenue begins depreciating compared to the previous year, these NPOs cut their 
services to retain their profit. 
2) The second argument is based on Tuckman and Chang’s (1991) assumption: 
When revenue begins depreciating compared to the previous year, these NPOs start 
depleting their profit to maintain the same level of services. 
3) The third argument is based off Bowman (2011) :  
When revenue begins depreciating compared to the previous year, service offerings and 
financial reserves will stay the same and debt with increase. 
4) The fourth argument is again supported by Calabrese and Ramirez: 
When revenue begins increasing compared to the previous year, NPOs will allocate more 
money toward profit than they will toward services. 
5) The fifth argument is again supported by Tuckman and Chang: 
When revenue increases, services and financial reserves will increase, but profit will stay 
the same. Table 3 displays these arguments with their corresponding authors. 
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Table 3 
Changes from 2009 to 2010 
Arguments Change in 
Revenue  
Change in 
Services 
Change in 
Financial 
Reserves  
Change in 
Profit/Debt  
Author 
1 Decrease Reduce Same Same (Calabrese, 
2012; 
Ramirez, 
2011)  
2 Decrease Same Same Decrease (Tuckman & 
Chang, 1991) 
3 Decrease Increased Same Decreased  (Bowman, 
2011) 
4 Increase Same Same Increase  (Calabrese, 
2012; 
Ramirez, 
2011) 
5 Increase Increase Increase Same  (Tuckman & 
Chang, 1991) 
 
The five possible arguments, based on the literature review, were examined using 
the empirical methodology that is described in the following section. This methodology 
was used to examine how NPOs behaved when their revenue began to change and if they 
did, in fact, behave (i.e., more in accordance with their for-profit counterparts) and to test 
if an open-systems theory can show that NPOs allocated more revenue toward profit than 
services to better adapt themselves to their external environment. It is hoped that doing so 
will provide insight into how this sector grew while receiving less financial support, as 
well as providing social workers with more insight on how they can help NPOs survive in 
difficult financial situations (Brown et al., 2013). Providing this insight can either reshape 
some of the assumptions educators and policy-makers have on how NPOs manage their 
finances in times of economic turmoil, or it can verify that these assumptions are correct 
after all. An important thing to consider, however, is if NPOs did operate in a Placid 
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Randomization Environment, then it is likely that they had to make choices that promoted 
their survival (i.e., building financial reserves), rather than choices that were more 
conducive to helping clients. This type of behavior seems justified, given the situation 
they were in, because they would allow NPOs to continue offering services (though at a 
lower rate), rather than discontinuing services altogether. Based on the literature review 
used in this study, the following methodology will offer four possible situations to 
describe how NPOs behaved when their revenue began to change, to see if they did in 
fact behave this way (i.e., more in accordance with their for-profit counterparts).  
The following methodology chapter describes how NPOs’ profit was affected 
during the great recession. This next chapter, additionally, defines ChangeRate in 
Revenue from 2009 to 2010 in NPOs as this study’s Independent Variable (IV) to clarify 
how change in these years will be measured. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
This study does not predict. It is a descriptive study that used longitudinal data to 
see how NPOs’ profit was affected when their revenue fluctuated during the Great 
Recession, looking specifically at the peak years from 2009 to 2010. The selection 
criteria for the sample were NPOs whose assets were between $500,000 and 
$100,000,000. The study’s sample consisted of 150 private nonprofit foundations whose 
assets were in this range. These private foundations were selected because their purpose 
is to financially support the service offerings of NPOs (Tuckman & Chang, 1991). Since 
these foundations award NPOs grants to continue offering the same level of services each 
year, they are in the best position to choose what is more important: accumulating profit, 
or generating services. This study’s research questions are 1) did NPOs experience an 
increase or a decrease in Revenue during this time; and 2) did NPOs allocate more money 
toward accumulating profit than to Service Expenses?  
Measure 
 In order to give an accurate measurement of the change in each private nonprofit 
foundation’s Revenue, Service Expenses, Financial Reserves, and Profit/Debt, this study 
examined the Change-Rate for each of these variables. The median Change-Rate was 
chosen as the most accurate way to measure the change in these variables because it 
described the individual change each private nonprofit foundation made from 2009 to
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 2010, rather than looking at how the entire sample of private nonprofit foundations 
changed as a whole, which could be misleading. The mathematical formula used in SPSS 
to calculate ChangeRate in each variable was.
 [(Value at end of 2010–Value at end of 2009)/Value at end of 2009] x 100% 
ChangeRate in Revenue 
This study’s Independent Variable (IV), Change in Revenue, was measured by 
first entering line 12 for each year of the IRS 990 Form into an excel spread-sheet and 
then subtracting year 2009 from 2010 to find the change. Line 12 of the IRS 990 Form 
represents total revenue. This difference in revenue between years 2009 and 2010 
indicates whether the NPO’s revenue increased or decreased. ChangeRate in Revenue 
was calculated by dividing Change in Revenue by Revenue 2009. The resulting decimal 
percentage indicates how much Revenue increased or decrease from 2009 and is expessed 
as a positive or negative number.    
ChangeRate in Service Expenses 
This is one of three Dependent Variables (DV). Service Expenses Change was 
measured by total expenses, listed on line 18 of IRS 990 Form, and was calculated the 
same way as the IV; this way of calculation went for the rest of this study’s DVs. 
ChangeRate in Service Expenses was calculated by dividing Service Expenses Change by 
Service Expenses 2009. The resulting number represents in a decimal form how much 
Service Expenses increased or decreased, depending on whether the resulting number is 
negative or positive. It should be remembered IRS 990 Forms do not include any value 
that is a direct measure of actual spending on Service Expenses. As suggested in the 
literature (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000), using line 18 of the IRS 990 Form is nevertheless 
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the best way to gain an accurate understanding of what NPOs spent on services. Line 18 
is comprised of everything that is spent on services and administration costs.   
ChangeRate in Profit/Debt 
In order to measure this DV, Profit/Debt 2009 and Profit/Debt 2010 were 
calculated by using line 22 of IRS 990 Form for the corresponding year. This is what is 
left over after total expenses and liabilities are taken into consideration. If the number 
that is left over is positive, the NPO has no Debt. If this number is negative, the NPO has 
no Profit. Profit/Debt Change was calculated by subtracting Profit/Debt 2009 from 
Profit/Debt 2010. A negative number suggests an increase in the leftover and a positive 
number suggests a decrease. Finally, ChangeRate in Profit/Debt was calculated by 
dividing Profit/debt Change by Profit/Debt 2009. The value in this DV indicates how 
much percentage the leftover increased (i.e., positive value) or decreased (i.e., negative 
value) compared to the previous year. 
Financial reserves  
The term financial reserves refers to how well revenue can be used to pay service 
expenses, and is expressed as a percentage. NPOs whose perentage is closer to 1 will be 
more able to use their revenue to pay their sercie expenses. Tuckman and Change (1991) 
invented four financial ratios to create this percentage. This study chose to use two of 
Tuckman and Chang’s ratios to determine how much cash an NPO has in its Financial 
Reserves, which means these two ratios will be listed separately. The two ratios that 
define Financial Reserves for this study were Equity Balance: Subtracting liabilities from 
Assets (restricted/unrestricted accounts and liquid cash), and then dividing by total 
Revenue: (Assets–Liabilities)/Total Revenue, and Operating Margins: Subtracting 
42 
 
 
expenditures from revenues, and then dividing by revenues (Revenues–Expenses) = Total 
Surplus/Revenue. These two financial ratios clearly depict the amount of revenue NPOs 
have available in Revenue to pay total expenses and liabilities, but they do not measure 
what Profit NPOs have available to put toward total expenses. The previously mentioned 
spread-sheet used these two ratio analyses formulas to recreate the financial reserves for 
each year. The change in each financial reserve will be measured by first subtracting the 
2009 financial reserve from the 2010 financial reserve. The ChangeRate in ‘financial 
reserves’ is again calculated by dividing financial reserve Change by financial reserve 
2009. The remaining decimal value indicates if the DV increased or decreased.  
Data Collection 
 The list of private nonprofit foundations used for this study was provided at no 
cost by an Abilene Christian University (ACU) library researcher. The search terms used 
to obtain this data were nonprofits; charitable giving; foundations; and assets between 
$500,000 and $100,000,000. This study’s sample came from the Foundation Center data-
base. Again, data was entered manually into an excel spread-sheet and then uploaded to 
SPSS. To reduce the likelihood of data entry error, several IRS 990 Forms were chosen at 
random to verify this information was correctly entered. 
Data Analysis 
Correlation analyses were conducted on the data to see the bivariate correlations 
between the IV and the DV, using Pearson’s r and Spearman’s rho. This study considers 
these correlations to be associations, so as not to confuse with the word correlation with 
the word causation. The following chapter displays this study’s results.
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
This chapter displays the results of what happened in this study’s sample of 
private nonprofit foundations when their Revenue fluctuated. The main purpose of 
displaying these results was to 1) see if these NPOs’ Revenue increased at a time when 
their Revenue sources were unstable; and 2) to see if it did increase, would more Revenue 
be allocated toward accumulating Profit than generating Services? This chapter answered 
these questions by 1) displaying the descriptive features of the 150 private nonprofit 
foundations; 2) displaying the statistical findings of these foundations; and 3) displaying 
the associations between the IV and the DV. All this is not only to answer the two 
research questions; it is to gain insight into how financial management was conducted in 
NPOs. The next chapter discusses these results, their implications, and this study’s 
limitations. 
Descriptive Features 
Table 4 provided the descriptive features of the 150 private nonprofit foundations, 
breaking them down into asset size, category of services, and location in America. This 
represents the kind of private nonprofit foundations this study looked at. Accordingly, 91 
NPOs (60.7%) had between $1,000,000 and $100,000,000; 59 NPOs (39.2%) had assets
between $500,000 and $1,000,000. 78 NPOs  (52.0%) provided Education services; 26 
NPOs (17.3%) provided Human Services; 16 NPOs (10.7%) provided Art services; 14
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 NPOs (9.3%)  provided Grants services; 3 NPOs (2.0%) provided Religious 
services; and 1 NPO provided Environmental services (0.7%). 57 NPOs (38.0%) were 
located in the NorthEast; 29 NPOs (19.3%) were located in the MidWest; 23 NPOs 
(15.3%) were located in the SouthEast; 23 NPOs (15.3%) were located in the West; and 
18 NPOs (12.0%) were located in the SouthWest. In sum, most NPOs made between 
$1,000,000 and $100,000,000, provided Education services, and came from the North 
East part of America. 
Table 4 
Descriptive Features of NPOs  
Variable Category N % 
Asset size $1,00,0000 – $100,000,00 91 60.7% 
 $500,000 – $1,000,000 59 39.2% 
Category of Services Education 78 52.0% 
 Human Service 26 17.3% 
 Art 16 10.7% 
 Grants 14 9.3% 
 Health 12 8.0% 
 Religious 3 2.0% 
 Environmental 1 0.7% 
Location In America NorthEast 57 38.0% 
 MidWest 29 19.3% 
 SouthEast 23 15.3% 
 West 23 15.3% 
 SouthWest 18 12.0% 
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Statistical Findings 
The statistical findings of each major variable was provided to give researchers an 
idea of the financial shape the NPOs were in and to display how their financial situation 
changed from 2009 to 2010. For reasons described in the previous chapter, this study 
used the median ChangeRate (located in the third column of the bottom row of each 
major variable’s table) to describe each IV and DV. The median ChangeRate for each 
major variable was multiplied by 100% to get the proper percent change. A histogram 
was provided to give a visual representation of how the variables were distributed from 
2009 to 2010; this was to see if there was a normal or nonnormal distribution. 
 To answer the question did revenue increase or decrease, the IV Revenue was 
calculated by SPSS. The results of this calculation, as displayed by the ChangeRate in 
Table 5 and Figure 1, indicated a nonnormal distribution in the IV ChangeRate in 
Revenue. The distribution was nonnormal because the Skewness (SKW) was low (6.35), 
and the Kurtosis (KOR) was high (46.22). Therefore, the most accurate way to see how 
much Revenue changed was to look at the median ChangeRate, which was .56. Looking 
at the mean would be misleading, as doing so assumes the variable was normally 
distributed. Likewise, looking at the RevChange is also misleading because it also looks 
at the sample as a whole, which would allow the outliers to misrepresent what the actual 
change was. Multiplying the median ChangeRate by 100% answered the question by 
indicating Revenue increased 56% from 2009 to 2010.  
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Table 5                                                                                                                    
Descriptive Statistics of Major Variable: Revenue 2009/2010 
 
  Min   Max Median       IQR    Mean SK KO 
Revenue 2009 -$10568K $57840K     $111K $3529K $2616K 4.32 25.4 
Revenue 2010   -$9749K $59002K   $1542K $5254K $4404K 3.71 17.9 
Revenue 
Change 
-$48638K $43100K $149K $3101K $1787K -0.39 15.1 
ChangeRate 
in Revenue 
-803% 8626% 56% 234% 276% 6.35 46.22 
Min: Minimum Value, Max: Maximum Value, IQR: Interquartile Range, SK: Skewness, 
KO: Kurtosis  
 
Figure 1. Median ChangeRate in RevenueTable 6 displays the descriptive 
statistics and the histogram of the DV: ChangeRate in Service Expenses 2009/2010. To 
answer the question did services increase or decrease when revenue fluctuated, the DV 
Service Expenses was calculated by SPSS, which showed a nonnormal distribution. 
Again, because SKW was 11.9, and the KOR was 143.8, looking at the median 
ChangeRate, and multiplying it by 100%, answered the question. Service Expenses 
increased by 1.4% when revenue fluctuated.  
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Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics of Major Variable: Service Expenses 2009/2010 (SE) 
  Min  Max Median       IQR    Mean SK KO 
SE2009 -$4042K $42359K  $1606K $4683K $3188K 4.034 25.4 
SE2010   -$41K $35372K   $2513K $4753K $3437K 3.29 16.1 
SE Change -$6987K $9575K      $1K $443K $248K 1.518 15.5 
ChangeRate 
in SE 
-2.26% 604.7% 1.4% 38% 485% 11.9 144 
Min: Minimum Value, Max: Maximum Value, IQR: Interquartile Range, SK: Skewness, 
KO: Kurtosis  
 
Figure 2. Median ChangeRate in Service Expenses. 
 To answer the question did profit or debt increase when revenue fluctuated, the 
DV Profit/Debt was calculated by SPSS, which showed a nonnormal distribution. SKW 
was 11.73, and KOR was 140.81. Therefore, multiplying the median ChangeRate by 
100% answered the question. Since this was a positive number, Profit increased 43% 
when revenue fluctuated. For it to have been a decrease in Profit, the median ChangeRate 
would have to have been negative. Table 7 displayes the descriptive statistics and the 
histogram of the dependent variable: ChangeRate in Profit/Debt 2009/2010. 
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Table 7 
Descriptive statistics of major variable: Profit/Debt 2009/2010 
  Min   Max Median       IQR    Mean SK KO 
Profit/Debt 
2009 
-$52928K $44514K     -$73K $2269K -$610K 0.59 22.76 
Profit/Debt 
2010 
  -
$45121K 
$150485K   -$18K $142K $1863K 7.86 83.41 
Profit/Debt 
Change 
-$49627K $160288K      $95K $2608K $2473K 6.74 71.14 
ChangeRate in 
Profit/Debt 
-6596% 170294% 43% 163% 1406% 11.73 140.8 
Min: Minimum Value, Max: Maximum Value, IQR: Interquartile Range, SK: Skewness, 
KO: Kurtosis 
 
 
Figure 3. Median ChangeRate in Profit/Debt. 
To answer the question did the financial reserve operational margin increase or 
decrease when revenue fluctuated, the DV Operational Margin was calculated by SPSS, 
which showed a nonnormal distribution. SKW was -2.72, and KOR was 69.54. 
Therefore, using the median ChangeRate, and multiplying it by 100%, answered the 
question. The DV Operational Margin decreased by -15% when revenue fluctuated. 
Table 8 displays the descriptive statistics and the histogram of the DV: ChangeRate in 
Operational Margin.  
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Table 8  
Descriptive Statistics of major variable: Operational Margin 2009/2010 (OM) 
  Min   Max Median       IQR    Mean SK KO 
OM2009 -21.30 74.55     0.14 2.42 0.65 6.71 65.54 
OM2010   -65.94 68.57   -0.04 1.39 -0.75 0.37 55.56 
OM Change -74.97 40.36      -0.16 2.39 -1.40 -4.37 34.8 
ChangeRate in 
OM 
-368% 290% -15% 1.99% -0.98 -2.72 69.54 
Min: Minimum Value, Max: Maximum Value, IQR: Interquartile Range, SK: Skewness, 
KO: Kurtosis  
 
 
Figure 4. Median ChangeRate in Operational Margin. 
To answer the question did the financial reserve equity balance increase or 
decrease when revenue fluctuated, the DV Equity Balance was calculated by SPSS, 
which showed a nonnormal distribution. SKW was 5.09; and the KOR was 30.15. The 
question was answered by multiplying the median ChangeRate by 100%. The DV Equity 
Balance increased 24% when revenue fluctuated. Table 9 displays the descriptive 
statistics and the histogram of the dependent variable: ChangeRate in Equity Balance 
2009/2010. 
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Table 9  
Descriptive statistics of major variable: Equity Balance 2009/2010 (EB) 
  Min   Max Median       IQR    Mean SK KO 
EB 2009 -829.21 512.61     11.48 38.56 14.54 -2.96 34.96 
EB 2010   -190.09 511.02   20.50 27.51     34.84 4.01 23.70 
EB Change -267.48 846.33      1.95 36.95 20.30 4.07 29.45 
ChangeRate 
in EB 
-11.24% 60.95% 24% 1.98% 2.42% 2.42 30.15 
Min: Minimum Value, Max: Maximum Value, IQR: Interquartile Range, SK: Skewness, 
KO: Kurtosis  
 
 
Figure 5. Median ChangeRate in Equity Balance. 
Associations 
Descriptive statistics indicated Revenue increased 56%, Profit increased 43%, 
Services increased 1.4%, Operational Margin decreased -15%, and Equity Balance 
increased 24%. Association tests were run to see the associations between the IV and the 
DVs. These tests did not show an increase in Revenue caused an increase in Profit; they 
only showed what the association is between the variables. Because the distribution of the 
variables included in the association analyses were not normally distributed, this study 
examined each associations using two different coefficients: a Spearman’s rho and a 
Pearson’s r. The Spearman’s rho test rank ordered the variables to account for the 
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nonnormal distribution, while the Pearson’s r tested for associations as a whole. Of note, 
though the Pearson’s r displays what actually happened because it does not account for 
the nonnormal distribution, a Spearman’s rho more accurately displays the associations 
between the variables.  
Table 10 displays the results of these two association tests. The Spearman’s rho 
showed a positive moderate association (.756) between 1) Revenue and Profit; 2) a 
positive weak association between Revenue and Operational Margin (.357); and 3) a 
negative weak association between Revenue and Equity Balance. All three of these 
associations were statistically significant. There was no associations between the IV and 
Service Expenses for both tests, nor was there an association between the IV and any of 
the DVs using the Pearsons’ r. Looking at the sample as a whole, therefore, indicated 
Revenue increased, but it did not indicate an association between Revenue and the other 
DVs. However, using the Spearman’s rho to account for the nonnormal distribution 
indicated there was an association between Revenue, Profit, and the two Financial 
Reserves, but it did not indicate an association between Revenue and Service Expenses.  
Table 10 
Associations between IV and DV using Spearman’s rho and Pearson’s r 
 
  Change in Revenue  
 
 Spearman’s rho Pearson’s r 
Change in Service Expenses .026 0.078 
Change in Operational Margin .357** 0.044 
Change in Equity Balance -.309* -0.097 
Change in Profit .756** 0.027 
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For clarification, Figure 6 showed the statistical significance in the positive 
association between Revenue and Profit. Figure 7 displayed the results of the Pearson’s r 
between the same variables, indicating that as a whole there is no association between 
Revenue and Profit.  
 
Figure 6. Spearman’s rho Association between Revenue and Profit.
 
Figure 7. Pearson’s r Association between Revenue and Profit. 
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Summary 
 To summarize this chapter’s results, most NPOs came from the North East part of 
America, offered Educational Services, and had between $1,000,000 and $100,000,000 in 
assets. Individually, or for each NPO, Revenue increased 56%, Service Expenses only 
increased 1.4%, Profit increased 43%; Operational Margin decreased -15%, and Equity 
Balance increased 24%. Overall, Revenue did not decrease. This study’s research 
questions were 1) did Revenue increase for these NPOs during the recession years from 
2009 to 2010; and 2) did NPOs allocate more Revenue toward accumulating Profit than 
toward generating Service Expenses. The results answered these two research questions 
by indicating Revenue increased, and more of it was allocated toward Profit than toward 
Service Expenses. The most interesting finding was, when using a Spearman’s rho, a 
moderate positive and statistically significant association (.756) occurred between 
Revenue and Profit, but no association occurred between Revenue and Services when 
using the same test. There was not an association between any of the variables when 
looking at the sample as a whole, using a Pearson’s r. The association instead occurred by 
rank ordering the NPOs, which indicates that, individually, each NPO mainly allocated 
more Revenue toward accumulating Profit. However, this study only looked at the 
associations between the IV and the DVs; it did not establish a causal relationship 
between these variables. There is an association between most of the variables. The next 
chapter discusses what these statistical findings and associations mean and what support 
they provide for the various authors’ arguments, as they were discussed in the literature 
review. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, IMPLICATIONS 
Discussion 
The overall results of this study indicated the NPOs allocated more Revenue 
toward accumulating Profit than toward generating Services, thereby providing empirical 
support for Calabrese (2012) and Ramirez’s (2011) general argument that, over time, 
NPOs mainly accumulate Profit. Thus, the first research question, whether revenue 
increased for NPOs during this time in history, was affirmed, as well as the second 
research question regarding the relationship between Revenue and Profit. What is 
interesting to consider, though, is the results also indicated NPOs maintained the same 
level of Services regardless of the circumstances, even when their Profit increased. It 
would seem private nonprofit foundations maintained the same level of Services, despite 
having the financial capacity to generate more Services. This was surprising because the 
literature suggested that by 2009 the need for Services was increasing (Brown et al., 
2013). For example, more people needed education to secure better jobs at this time in 
America’s history and so would need these private nonprofit foundations to help 
accommodate them (Brown et al., 2013).  
Explaining why this did not happen is beyond the scope of this study, but it was 
suggested in the literature (by Brown et al., 2013) that perhaps these NPOs needed to 
accumulate Profit because their external environment was unstable? Based on this study’s
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 findings, this suggestion seems unlikely. It was Brown et al. (2013), after all, who found 
the nonprofit sector mainly, grew during the recession, and this finding is in-line with 
research by Calabrese (2012), and Ramirez (2011). This study supports the idea that 
NPOs at this time were receiving more Revenue and using it to increase their Profit by 
only slightly increasing services when their revenue increased. However, because the 
nonprofit business was booming at a time when more services were needed, this study 
raised issues of social justice in how finances are sometimes managed in NPOs. For 
example, if Services were not generated because these NPOs wanted to continue 
profiting, then they should not be tax-exempt; otherwise, they are using their 501 © status 
to accumulate profit. 
As discussed in the introduction, as long as NPOs do not make more than three 
times the amount needed to pay total Service Expenses, they can be tax-exempt and 
receive an A or A- rating (Give.org, n.d.; IRS, n.d.). While there is no legal reason why 
NPOs cannot accumulate more profit than generate services, because doing so is 
nevertheless contrary to what it means to be a nonprofit, it can be questioned at what 
point should profiting NPOs be tax-exempt. This is an issue further research can clarify. 
Contrary to what was expected in the literature review, this study found NPOs 
generally maintained the same level of Services, despite their revenue increasing, and that 
they probably allocated more Revenue toward increasing Profit than they will toward 
increasing service expenses. The moderate association between the variables Profit and 
Revenue suggests these NPOs’ financial behavior might be explained by positive revenue 
fluctuation. This is interesting. It supports Tuckman and Chang’s (1991) initial 
implication that NPOs will do all they can to maintain the same level of Services, but it 
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does not support the argument that over time an NPO’s Profit will grow in proportion to 
its Services. Profit, after all, increased by 43%, which is about 28 times more than the 
increase in Service Expenses (43% / 1.4% = 28). 
The Spearman’s association coefficient between ChangeRate in Revenue and 
ChangeRate in Operational Margin was positive and weak, statistically significant, but it 
decreased by -15%. This means as Revenue increased the Operational Margin decreased, 
which at first seems confusing, because if revenue increased then the NPOs’ ability to 
pay Services should also increase. The Operational Margin, after all, displays a 
percentage of how well revenue can pay Service Expenses. Since this percentage 
decreased, the NPOs’ ability to pay Service Expenses was reduced, even though there 
was an association between revenue and the Operational Margin. A possible explanation 
is even though some Revenue was allocated toward Service Expenses, which explains 
why there is a positive weak association between Revenue and Operational Margin, the 
Operational Margin is still -15% less than the previous year. More likely, though, an 
increase in Revenue does not indicate an NPO’s ability to pay its Service Expenses will 
increase. 
Equity Balance, as pointed out earlier, uses an NPO’s assets to calculate its ability 
to pay liabilities. Though Equity Balance increased 24%, there was a negative association 
between it and Revenue, which suggested as Revenue increased the Equity Balance 
should have decreased. Because the Equity Balance increased, it is likely that the Equity 
Balance is not explained by revenue fluctuation. Again, just because Revenue increases, 
that does not mean a NPO’s ability to pay its liabilities will be affected. Financial 
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Reserves, after all, do not take into consideration an NPO’s Profit, which may be what 
NPOs use to generate Service Expenses. 
Were NPOs in a Placid Randomization Environment? 
The reason NPOs in this study accumulated Profit more than they worked toward 
generated Services was to be explained by their being in a Placid Randomization 
Environment, where in order to survive they had to take extreme measure (i.e., cut 
services to keep their profit) (Emery & Trist, 1962). The assumption is if the NPOs did 
not take such drastic measures, they may be forced to shut their doors, permanently 
(Brown et al., 2013). Using this explanation to understand why NPOs in this study’s 
sample does not seem logical. For instance, were it true, how could they be a Placid 
Randomization Environment if overall they were able to increase their profit more than 
their service expenses? It seems more likely these NPOs were in an environment where 
they could predict what was about to happen in regards to their funding and so were 
comfortable with increasing their Profit, and keeping their Services the same. 
The kind of environment these NPOs were in which would have allowed them to 
predict what their revenue source might do is better defined as a Placid Cluster 
Environment (Emery & Trist, 1962). As said in the literature review, this is an 
environment that is relatively stable; the NPO can make predictions on where and how 
much funding will come in each year, as well as how much should be allocated toward 
Profit (Emery & Trist, 1963). When considering so much more could have been spent on 
Services, it could be argued demands for Services did not increase very much from 2009 
to 2010 for this population sample. This does not seem likely. It was found the need for 
Services has always increased (Brown et al., 2013). This again supports the notion that 
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these NPOs operated in an environment in which there was a stable demand for Services, 
and Revenue sources were reliable—enough to create Profit.  
To answer the question why did they not generate more Services, it could be the 
demand for services never increased that much, thereby allowing them to instead 
accumulate more Profit. It make more sense to attribute the steady demand for Service 
Expenses, and the increase in profit, to a Placid Cluster Environment, as was implied by 
the Urban Institute report, which indicated the nonprofit sector grew by 8.6% from 2002 
to 2012 (Brown et al., 2013; McKeever & Pettijohn, 2014; Ramirez, 2011). What is 
more, if the environment these NPOs operated in was truly random, as it would have to 
be to be a true Placid Randomization Environment, why does it seem relatively easy to 
predict what they are going to do, based on how their revenue fluctuates? The answer is 
probably because the environment they operated in is not as random as it may have 
seemed. Therefore, this study supports the argument that NPOs were not in as an extreme 
environment as it would have seemed they were in (Brown et al., 2013). 
Limitations 
A major limitation in this study is researcher bias toward thinking NPOs with 
assets between $500,000 and $1,000,000 are generally focused on accumulating profit, as 
opposed to generating services. It is simply not always the case that such NPOs are 
focused on accumulating Profit; in fact, their assets might be at this level because they are 
more focused on generating services than accumulating Profit. However, even though the 
NPOs for this study were selected at random (the only search criteria were nonprofits; 
charitable giving; foundations; and assets between $500,000 and $100,000,000), the 
study found NPOs mainly accumulated Profit. 
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Another limitation is it is not logical to argue line 18, total expenses, on the IRS 
990 Form accurately represents Service Expenses because total expenses include more 
than what is spent on Service Expenses. However, since Services did not increase nearly 
as much as Profit did, it can be argued that service offerings also did not increase as 
much. A limitation of this study is because 18 on the IRS 990 Forms, which is where the 
data on service expenses was collected from, lists together what is spent on Services and 
administration cost, there is no way of knowing how much exactly was spent on Services, 
as opposed to administrative and overhead cost. Without knowing how much was spent 
on Services, as opposed to non-service costs, the argument that NPOs were more 
interested in accumulating Profit is incomplete. Service Expenses could have increased, 
and non-service expenses decreased, while Total Spending remained unchanged. Future 
studies could talk with each NPO’s financial department to get an itemized list of what 
was spent on Services; however, accomplishing such a project would be time consuming, 
expensive, and labor intensive. IRS 990 Forms are not entirely representative, but since 
they do give a fairly accurate description of an NPO’s financial behavior, researchers can 
make fairly accurate arguments based on them.  
A third limitation of this study is how representative is this study’s population 
sample to the nonprofit sector as a whole? It must be remembered that since private 
foundations were used for this study’s sample, the NPOs used in this study received 
funding from private individuals, unlike public NPOs who receive funding from 
government sources. As such, because private foundations typically carry less in total 
liabilities (total liabilities are the amount an NPO owes to another organization/entity 
(Bowman, 2011)), they should have more leeway in how they choose to spend their 
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finances. It would be expected they are the ones who are able to give more because they 
have fewer total liabilities, whereas public NPOs are more constrained in how much they 
can spend due their having higher total liabilities. If this constraint separates public from 
private NPOs, it may make this study’s sample less representative of the nonprofit sector 
as a whole. The private foundations seem to have gathered Profit, and distributed it in 
small amounts. 
This study’s fourth limitation is since only correlations were made between the 
independent and dependent variables, it would be illogical to conclude, based on this 
study’s results, that Revenue fluctuations cause Change in Profit/Debt, regardless of how 
strong the correlation is. This study nevertheless provides a first step future researchers 
can use toward determining revenue fluctuation directly affects Change in Profit/Debt. 
Areas future studies can investigate are revenue fluctuation in public NPOs; the 
relationship between service increase and Profit margin; and whether Profit is associated 
with NPOs eventually shutting down. A major strength of this study is it shows NPOs 
better serve their communities by focusing on Profit accumulation. 
Implications for Practice, Research, and Education 
In-line with the profit-building argument presented in this study’s introduction, 
there is nothing inherently wrong with the Profit this study’s NPOs accumulated, so long 
as they did not accumulate more than three times the amount of Profit needed to sustain 
themselves (Give.org, n.d.; IRS, n.d.). An implication of this study for future research to 
study, then, is how much Profit are NPOs making, and is this amount within the 
regulations guidelines set by charity watchdogs? For this study, the amount of Profit 
NPOs made was much more that the amount they allocated toward Services, when 
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looking at the differences between both IV and DVs. This implies some of these NPOs 
may have been in violation of charity watchdog regulations. The results imply Profit 
seeking behavior on the part of NPOs more than behavior conducive to generating 
additional Services. The implication for social workers is the difference between 
nonprofit and for-profit management is not as different in some aspects as what might be 
expected, and this is also supported by Calabrese (2010), and Ramirez (2011).  
The main difference this study found is NPOs seemed to be willing to maintain 
the same level of Services, even if their Operational Margin decreases, which is an 
implication for social work practice. Social workers should, therefore, also take into 
consideration the notion that NPOs may be willing to take financial risk to continue 
offering Services and pay expenses. The suggestion is NPOs may be willing to drain their 
Profit in order to maintain the same level of services. A social worker working at the 
macro-level can therefore use this study to argue NPOs will maintain a certain level of 
Service. Social workers can expect there to be difficult times, but this study provided 
support for the notion that NPOs are very concerned about maintaining the same level of 
Service—but not so much in increasing their services. An additional implication for 
future research is whether NPOs that choose to go into debt to maintain the same level of 
Services end up closing their doors. This study provides a foundation for such research to 
be conducted.  
Future studies could also see if over time the nonprofit sector increased its Service 
offerings (Tuckman & Chang, 1991) in proportion to the amount of Profit it accumulates. 
This study did not find support for this argument. As suggested in the previous limitation 
section, this may be because this study’s population sample consists of private nonprofit 
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foundations and that these foundations are more geared toward accumulating Profit than 
public NPOs. If this is so, a major implication of this study for social work policy is 
private foundations may operate differently than public policies, and so may need a 
different set of regulations.  
Relevancy of this Study to Social Work Practice 
 A likely reason why studies like this have received little attention in the literature 
is it seems uncharacteristic, at least to the social work profession, of NPOs to hold their 
finances instead of using them to continue providing or increasing their Services 
(Calabrese, n.d.). Another goal of this study, therefore, is to broaden social workers’ 
understanding of how NPOs sometimes manage their finances. Overall, this study is to 
help social workers realize that when they go into their respective field they may need to 
consider ways to help NPOs avoid financial disaster. As such, without a basic 
understanding of how to do this, social work practitioners may be unprepared to deal with 
unexpected financial depreciations or be uncertain on whether or not their NPO is in a 
position to continue offering the same level of Services. This is especially pertinent when 
considering the nonprofit sector social workers work in comprises a significant part of the 
economy, and that if not properly managed, it could lead to fewer jobs being available to 
social workers (McKeever & Pettijohn, 2014). This larger environment can significantly 
affect social workers. 
Social work practitioners must, therefore, address these financial problems 
because they are charged with understanding how a client’s larger, external environment 
affects their clients, which means eventually they must also understand how the external 
environment affects their organization (Blalack, 2016; Sontag-Padilla et al., 2012). 
63 
 
 
Nevertheless, the general misconception that social work practitioners do not need to 
understand how to manage finances seems irrelevant, or unrelated, to helping them meet 
human needs, such as anxiety, depression, substance abuse, etc. (Blalack, 2016; Sontag-
Padilla et al., 2012). This is simply not true. In order for social workers to provide 
meaningful/effective services, they must understand that an NPO’s financial position 
directly affects their ability to help solve these human problems (Blalack, 2016; Sontag-
Padilla et al., 2012). What is more, because of the diversity of their educational training, 
social workers are often expected to move into managerial roles in which decisions are 
made over the allocation of finances (e.g., they may be asked what to do in case Revenue 
starts depreciating) (Blalack, 2016; Sontag-Padilla et al., 2012). 
The main reason why an understanding of financial management is indispensable 
to a social worker’s education, then, is social workers are responsible for understanding 
how it relates to a client’s (or organization’s) well-being (Prentice, 2015). It is often the 
case, for example, that the common denominator among many clients suffering from 
mental illnesses is they come from low-economic social classes (Jansson, 2009) and that 
social workers often spend a significant amount of time finding financial resources for 
them before they can start addressing their more complex needs (Johnsen & Teixeira, 
2012). In the same way, social workers must be prepared when moving into managerial 
roles to make financial decisions that affect their NPOs’ interaction with its external 
environment or else they will be ineffective as practitioners (Prentice, 2015). This study 
provides social workers with addition information to understand what to do when faced 
with tough financial decisions. 
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Importance of this Study for Social Work Education 
 The importance of this study lies in preparing social workers for the types of 
management decisions they most likely will encounter throughout their careers, as well as 
demonstrating what types of situations might bring about these decisions. This can be 
significant for social work educators, and policy writers, as augmenting our knowledge of 
what NPOs sometimes have to do to continue offering Services may very well change 
some of the ways management is taught in social work graduate programs. For example, 
instead of viewing, or teaching, that NPOs manage their finances in a way that is 
drastically different than their for-profit counterparts, this study showed NPOs and for-
profits manage their finances more similarly than educators and policy writer may believe 
(IRS, n.d.), at least when faced with revenue depreciation during uncertain financial 
times.  
What is normally taught in social work management classes, and implied in 
policies regarding 501 (c) (3) stipulations, though, is NPOs have a different mindset 
when managing their finances (Charity Navigator, 2016; Give.org). However, thinking 
this way can ignore the fact that NPOs can make the same financial decisions as for-
profit organizations and that sometimes they must make these kinds of decisions. 
Thinking NPOs are different, because of the populations they serve, may be a way of 
overlooking some of the similarities between the two. This study is import because it 
seeks to verify whether or not this is a misconception. If it is, then it is quite possible that 
additional views on financial management in NPOs should be considered when teaching 
social work students basic management skills. If it is not, then this study can be used to 
verify, or even strengthen, the normal conception researchers have toward financial 
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management in NPOs. In either case, examining this gap in the literature will provide 
useful information for researchers on both sides of the argument to examine.
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 This study sought to answer the questions: 1) did Revenue increase or decrease 
for NPOs during the Great Recession from 2009 to 2010; 2) and did NPOs during this 
time allocate more Revenue toward accumulating Profit than toward generating Services? 
It was found that little research had been done on the subject of Profit accumulation in 
NPOs (Calabrese, 2012); however, the literature suggested a time when NPOs may have 
accumulated Profit was during the great recession. Consistent with the literature, this 
study found NPOs allocated more revenue toward accumulating Profit than they did 
toward increasing Services from 2009 to 2010. Profit increased enough that future 
research could study to see if NPOs are making more Profit than what charity watchdogs 
permit them to make. It was also found that there are IRS regulations on how much profit 
NPOs can make. The most important implication was NPOs serve their communities best 
by focusing more on accumulating Profit than on generating Services.  
Contrary to what was expected, this study also found NPOs most likely operated 
in a Placid Cluster Environment. One where that allowed them to all consistently 
increase their Profit. This study concludes, therefore, on the idea that over time, NPOs 
will continue growing and increasing their Profit. As Nietzsche (trans. 1992) would say, 
just because accumulating Profit in NPOs seems counter to what is normally expected—
that does not necessarily mean what they are doing is evil.
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